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Recent Decisions
Adverse Possession - Husband And Wife Acquiring
Title By Adverse Possession Hold As Tenants In Common.
Preston v. Smith, 293 S. W. 2d 51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955),
Affirmed, Supreme Court of Tennessee, July, 1956. H and
W acquired title to certain realty by adverse possession,
after which H died intestate and then W died intestate.
The collateral heirs of H sought to eject the collateral heirs
of W on the theory that H acquired title by twenty years
exclusive possession adverse to the whole world, including
W. The collateral heirs of W defended on the grounds that
the joint adverse possession of H and W vested title in them
as tenants by the entireties, that such title passed to W by
survivorship, and that they succeeded to W's interest. The
chancellor found that by their joint possession H and W
acquired title as tenants in common with the result that the
heirs at law of H collectively owned a one half undivided
interest and the heirs at law of W collectively owned the
other one half undivided interest. On appeal, held, affirmed.
The estate of tenants by the entireties can only arise by
devise, deed, or other instrument and not by operation of
the statute of limitations. As for exclusive possession in H,
under the evidence in the case, H and W did not consider
the property exclusively that of H, and the intention and
purpose of the two having been expressed by them, the
equity court had the power as well as the duty to enforce
their intention to hold the property jointly. The resulting
estate therefore was a tenancy in common.
There are no Maryland cases on this point. However,
tenancies by the entireties in Maryland are discussed in
Columbian Carbon Company v. Kight, 207 Md. 203, 114 A.
2d 28 (1955), which cites Fladung v. Rose, 58 Md. 13 (1882),
for the statement that while the legal unity of husband and
wife no longer exists in Maryland as it existed at common
law, where "proper words are employed" and the intention
is manifest, a husband and wife are capable of holding as
either joint tenants or tenants in common.
Attorneys - Highest Court Has Inherent Power To
Prevent The Practice Of Law By Mortgage And Title
Companies. New Jersey State Bar Ass'n. v. Northern N.J.
Mtg. Ass'n., 22 N. J. 184, 123 A. 2d 498 (1956). Plaintiffs, the
state bar association and five of its officers, sued to enjoin
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the defendants, a mortgage company and an affiliate title
abstract company, from practicing law in that the mortgage
company and its affiliate prepared all the legal instruments
used in the former's loan business, "such as bonds, mort-
gages, affidavits, abstracts of title, title reports and title
certificates". The trial court dismissed the complaint on
the ground that it was without jurisdicion since the admis-
sion and discipline of members of the bar was vested in the
Supreme Court under the New Jersey Constitution (Art.
VI, Sec. II, par. 3). On appeal, held, reversed and remanded.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in such matters
did not rob the lower court of its original general jurisdic-
tion. The court considered the question of whether such
"practice of law" could be prohibited by the courts in view
of the fact that New Jersey penal statutes condemning un-
authorized practice specifically exempt those engaged in
the business of searching or insuring title to real estate,
in so far as their activities relate to (1) the rendering of
legal advice or to the preparation and execution of convey-
ances or other instruments connected with or incidental to
the guaranteeing or searching of titles to real estate, or (2)
activities relating to documents incidental to the leasing,
sale or exchange of real or personal property, or the loan-
ing of money on mortgages on real or personal property:
N. J. S. 2A: 170-81, N. J. S. A. The court held that under
the State Constitution granting it jurisdiction over the
practice of law, its jurisdiction is exclusive, and even in
the absence of such constitutional provision, is inherent.
While the legislature had acted to penalize unauthorized
practice, these penal statutes are an aid to and not a limita-
tion upon the regulatory power of the judiciary.
Although the Maryland Constitution makes no pro-
vision for controlling the practice of law, statutory control
has been asserted. Md. Code (1951), Art. 10, sets forth the
conditions for admission to practice and defines and imposes
penalties for unauthorized practice. Art. 27, Sec. 16, pro-
vides penalties for the practice of law by corporations, but
specifically exempts title companies, collection agencies,
and insurance companies defending the insured. What in-
herent jurisdiction the courts may exercise remains to
be developed.
Evidence - Privilege Of Journalist Not To Reveal His
Source Of Information Is Waived By Testimony As To
"Reliable Source". Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N. J.
139, 123 A. 2d 473 (1956). In a suit against a publisher for
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printing and circulating a libelous story, the defendant
pleaded, inter alia, good faith, fair comment, and lack of
malice. The defendant's editor testified that he had re-
ceived the story from a "reliable source" but claimed the
privilege of a state statute (N. J. S. 2A: 81-10, N. J. S. A.)
which provides that persons may not be compelled to dis-
close the source of information published in the newspaper
by which they are employed. The trial court over objection
admitted the testimony and upheld the privilege. On appeal
from a judgment for actual but not punitive damages, held,
reversed and remanded for retrial of punitive damages.
If the privilege is claimed, the defendant may not assert a
reliable source as indicating good faith, fair comment, and
lack of malice.
Maryland has a statute substantially the same as that
of New Jersey: Md. Code (1951), Art. 35, Sec. 2. The
privilege extends to persons connected with or employed
on newspapers and radio and television stations and may
be claimed ". . . in any legal proceeding or trial or before
any committee of the legislature or elsewhere..."
Labor Relations - Selling Of Business Can Be Termina-
tion Of Employment Requiring Seller To Pay Employees
Severance Pay. Adams v. Jersey Central Power & Light
Company, 120 A. 2d 737, 21 N. J. 8 (1956). Plaintiffs were
employees of the defendant under a contract providing
severance pay (one week's pay multiplied by number of
years' service) if employment should be terminated through
no fault of the employee. Defendant sold his business by
a contract under which the purchaser refused to assume
any liabilities of the defendant. Some of the plaintiffs were
rehired under a contract which stipulated that severance
pay would be calculated only on basis of continuous ser-
vice with the purchasers. Plaintiffs sued to receive sever-
ance pay. On appeal from judgment for plaintiffs, held,
affirmed.
Severance pay is recompense for termination of the
employment relationship, in the form of relief for the priva-
tions of job loss not caused by misconduct of the employee,
granted on the basis of service rendered during the period
of the agreement. Defendant's sale of the business was as
much a termination of the employment relation as a blanket
firing, in view of the fact that the purchaser refused to con-
tinue the agreement and plaintiffs consented to no novation.
See generally 147 A. L. R. 151; 40 A. L. R. 2d 1044.
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Negligence - Gift By Father Of Automobile To Adult
Son Known To Be Reckless And Addicted To Drink Will
Not Render Father Liable For Son's Negligent Operation
Thereof. Brown v. Harkleroad, 287 S. W. 2d 92 (Tenn. 1956).
The defendant, knowing of his adult son's propensity to
recklessness and drink, nevertheless gave him a used car,
in the negligent operation of which the son collided with
and injured the automobile of the plaintiff. On appeal from
judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant father,
held, reversed. In that automobiles are not categorized as
dangerous instrumentalities, it would be carrying the doc-
trine of concurrent liability to an abnormal degree to charge
the donor of an automobile with liability for subsequent
injuries resulting from the misuse of his gift.
Rounds v. Phillips, 166 Md. 151, 170 A. 532 (1934) and
168 Md. 120, 177 A. 174 (1935), established the primary
liability of a parent who, knowing or having reason to know
of his minor child's recklessness, fails to prohibit his oper-
ating an automobile. The language is strong enough to
raise serious doubt whether the "gift" maneuver would be
permitted as a means of insulating the parent from liability,
even if the child were adult. See note, Liability of Parents
for Tort of Child, 2 Md. L. Rev. 288 (1938).
Taxation - Liquidation Of Bad Debt, Substantially But
Inadequately Secured, May Be Postponed To Obtain Tax
Advantage. Loewi v. Ryan, 299 F. 2d 627 (2nd Cir. 1956).
In 1944 Loewi liquidated, for income tax deduction pur-
poses, a non-business debt for which he had held substantial
but wholly inadequate security. The deduction was dis-
allowed on the ground that under 26 U. S. C. A. Sec.
23(k) (4) (1948 ed.), Loewi was not justified in postponing
until 1944 the liquidation of the collateral, for, at least as
early as 1943, he knew that the unsecured part was com-
pletely worthless; that he should have deducted the debt
in 1943 and had no privilege to postpone foreclosing the
collateral until 1944 merely to secure a larger deduction
in his income tax. On appeal from a dismissal of Loewi's
complaint, held, reversed. A taxpayer is privileged to liqui-
date his security for whatever purpose he thinks most
profitable, the reduction of taxes being a valid purpose; the
taxpayer's motive being irrelevant. To encumber the privi-
lege with the terms "good faith, economic reality", etc.,
used by the trial court is to deny the full measure of the
privilege. Frank, Circuit Judge, dissented: when valid
business considerations cease to exist, the taxpayer may
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not have the benefit, for tax purposes, of postponing such
foreclosure. The tax statutes were drawn to fix, so far as
practicable, the precise year in which the deduction must
be claimed. The debt should have been deducted in the
year the debt became, aside from the collateral, wholly
worthless, that is, no later than 1943. The case should be
reversed solely to determine whether Loewi, in good faith
postponed liquidating the collateral until 1944 for what he
deemed valid business purposes.
A multitude of cases hold that before a taxpayer can
deduct for a bad debt, he must foreclose the collateral
security and apply it to the debt. Further, he must deduct
the debt in the taxable year in which, using an objective
test, the debt actually becomes worthless. In Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Magruder, 50 F. Supp. 817 (D. C.
Md. 1943), reversed on other grounds, 139 F. 2d 751 (4th
Cir. 1944), it was said that the true test, in determining
whether a debt may be deducted from gross income by a
taxpayer, as a "bad debt" in filing the return, is when the
taxpayer, acting in good faith, actually ascertained the
debt to be worthless. In Reed v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 129 F. 2d 908 (4th Cir. 1942), it was said that no
deduction for partial bad debts need be taken, even though
the taxpayer may have ascertained it to be partially worth-
less in a specific amount, but the taxpayer may wait until
some future event definitely fixes the exact amount of the
loss. See also language in the opinions of Old Colony Trust
Associates v. Hassett, 150 F. 2d 179 (1st Cir. 1945); Indus-
trial Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 206
F. 2d 229 (1st Cir. 1953), which seem to be in accord with
the principal that in case of non-business debts the existence
of any security, not merely nominal in value, prevents the
debt from being entirely worthless.
Zoning - Refusal To Extend Non-Conforming Use.
Ranney v. Istituto Pontificio Delle Maestre Filippini, 119
A. 2d 142, 20 N. J. 189 (1955). On appeal from a prerogative
writ of township authorities permitting a parochial teacher
training school - a non-conforming use in a residential
zone - to erect additional facilities on its 100 acre tract,
held, (4-3), reversed. Conceding that the land is unsuitable
for residential homes, the granting of a variance in this case
so as to extend a non-conforming use is "directly antagon-
istic to the design and purpose of the ordinance and sound
zoning". The spirit of zoning has been to restrict rather
than to increase non-conforming uses.
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Baltimore City Code (1950) Art. 40, Sec. 11, contains the
following provision: "A non-conforming use may not be ex-
tended, except as hereinafter provided.... A non-conform-
ing use may be changed to a use of the same classifica-
tion.... ." Colati v. Jirout, 186 Md. 652, 47 A. 2d 613 (1946),
did not permit a cafe owner to rebuild on a larger scale,
stating that the Zoning Ordinance requires a strict inter-
pretation pertaining to extension of non-conforming uses.
Knox v. City of Baltimore, 180 Md. 88, 96, 23 A. 2d 15 (1941),
concludes that restriction of such extension is not unrea-
sonable, arbitrary, or oppressive. To the same effect is
Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 164 A. 743 (1933). However,
City of Baltimore v. Cohn, 204 Md. 523, 105 A. 2d 482 (1954),
allowed the building of a garage in an area zoned as a resi-
dential use district where the tract in question was only
adaptable to commercial purposes.
A subtle distinction sometimes arises between exten-
sion and change of a non-conforming use. In Roach v. Zon-
ing Appeals Board, 175 Md. 1, 199 A. 812 (1938), defendant
operated an ice factory and a planing mill on adjoining lots.
Both uses were non-conforming and of the same classifica-
tion. The discontinuance of the planing mill and enlarge-
ment of the ice factory so as to encompass both lots was
granted because this was a change of a non-conforming use
to another use of the same classification. No mention was
made that this was perhaps an extension of the non-con-
forming ice factory operation. In accord is Bruning Bros.
v. City of Baltimore, 199 Md. 602, 87 A. 2d 589 (1952), where
construction of a two-story warehouse on a tract of land
previously used for loading and unloading purposes was
held to have changed a non-conforming use rather than
extended it. But compare Fritze v. City of Baltimore, 202
Md. 265, 96 A. 2d 4 (1953), where there was refusal of an
application to build a florist shop on land upon which a neon
sign and temporary stalls for the sale of flowers had stood
for a number of years. This did not establish a non-con-
forming use and is thereby distinguished from the Bruning
Bros. case. The Colati case is cited as authority. A further
distinction arises in Nyburg v. Solmson, 205 Md. 150, 106 A.
2d 483 (1954), where complete utilization of an open area
for the storage of new cars was an intensification rather
than an extension of a non-conforming use, and, therefore,
permissible. The area had previously been used partially
for the overnight parking of neighborhood cars.
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